By adopting these protocols, member states have contributed to a global script on how regional organizations can deal with inter and intra-state conflict. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) has taken up this lead and adopted similar -although not identical -instruments in the years that followed (see Leininger in this volume). From a global perspective, however, the specific formulations find very few imitators. ECOWAS also continues to be the only regional organization that regularly threatens member states with military intervention in cases of norm violation. In recent unconstitutional power accessions in Côte d'Ivoire (2010), Guinea-Bissau (2012), and Mali (2012), ECOWAS military and police forces were deployed to support pro-democratic forces in member states.
From a theoretical perspective, the adoption of the protocol with such strong forms of delegation is surprising. Both the neo-functional approach to regional integration as well as the realist perspective would not have predicted such a development. According to the logic of neo-functionalism, the pooling of sovereignty occurs in an incremental fashion driven by considerations of (economic) utility and efficiency (Haas 1958) . Economic actors operating across borders push for cooperation merely in technical areas of cooperation, which leads to processes of spill-over in adjacent policy fields. According to this logic, integration in 'high politics' such as in the field of security policy occurs after a long process of increasing interdependence in other less politicized policy fields. Regional integration in ECOWAS, however, has not progressed successfully in the technical and economic sphere since the organization's creation in 1975. Some advances have been made with regard to trade liberalization since the 1990s; but many obstacles to the successful increase of intra-regional trade have continued to exist on the ground. Economic integration in ECOWAS has certainly not 'spilled over' into the field of security politics. Prior to the adoption of the ProtocolMechanism, ECOWAS also had no history of involvement with 'high politics', although a Protocol of Non-Aggression was adopted in 1978, and the revised treaty of 1993 had introduced some general ideas about ECOWAS being an organization concerned with 76 democracy and stability. The puzzle remains why the West African regional organization quite suddenly became such an innovating force in the field of high politics.
Followers of realist approaches to international relations would also have trouble to explain the large extent of delegation that ECOWAS member states have been willing to attribute to an international organization (Kahler 2000, Solingen 2008). Realism particularly struggles to explain the role of the regional hegemon Nigeria, who concedes decision-making power to weaker states while it previously had the prerogative to decide on military interventions alone, as it had done in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Also, realism does not provide a convincing account of why a number of openly autocratic regimes among ECOWAS member states might have signed such a protocol. They were already violating the provisions at the moment of the signing of the protocol and had to fear strong political and even military pressure for political liberalization.
The question -which is at the core of this chapter -therefore remains why ECOWAS member states have established a military intervention mechanism that is activated in the case of a 'serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law' and 'in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government'?
In order to answer this question, we will first outline the exact functioning and content of the 1999 protocol. Then, we will present our main argument: While a window of opportunity was opened by a will to curb negative externalities of earlier civil wars, it was Nigeria as a democratizing hegemon and other democratizing states that sought to lock-in its domestic democratic development at the regional level. Nigeria pushed for and finally established the Protocol also in order to preserve its intervention capacities. This was possible because autocratic states were seeking international legitimacy through signing the protocol and were at the same time expecting that it would not be enforced. The exact content of the protocol was provided by the ECOWAS Commission and external experts.
THE PROTOCOL-MECHANISM -PRESCRIBING AND PROMOTING STANDARDS FOR LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE INSTITUTIONS
The Protocol-Mechanism is a far-reaching although incomplete document, establishing primarily a mechanism of collective security (Abass 2000). It is also an interesting document because it starts to define a comprehensive concept of security, which includes instances in which the mechanism is supposed to be initiated, for example a lack of human rights and democratic governance. While the prescriptions and concrete policies to promote said prescriptions remain relatively vague, the innovation of the protocol lies mainly in the various institutions it creates -in conjunction with a strong mandate to enforce these in member states 
Prescription
The 1999 Protocol starts again with a list of principles (Article 2), including a commitment by member states to promote and consolidate 'democratic government as well as democratic institutions in each Member State' and to protect 'fundamental human rights and freedoms and the rules of international law'. Among the 12 objectives of the mechanism we not only find the prevention, management and resolution of internal and inter-state conflicts, but also the protection of the environment, and the commitment to safeguard the cultural heritage of member states. We do not find here the explicit objective to use the mechanism to strengthen the democratic process or the rule of law or the respect for human rights. This is quite surprising as the Protocol stipulates explicitly in Article 25 that the Mechanism might be applied 'in the event of serious and massive violation of human rights and the rule of law' or 'in the event of an overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government'.
ECOWAS policies
Despite being vague regarding standards, the Protocol contains several policies to promote them. This is due to the fact that the document is mainly concerned with the ways and means available to ECOWAS when intervening in member states to mitigate violent conflicts. Under the heading Peace-Building and in order to 'stem social and political upheavals, ECOWAS shall be involved in the preparation, organization and supervision of elections in Member
States. ECOWAS shall also monitor and actively support the development of democratic institutions in Member States' (Article 42-1). This is a rather general mandate, however, the article neither specifies which ECOWAS organ should become active nor which democratic institutions in member states should be particularly developed. According to Article 45, which deals with the restoration of political authority 'in cases where the authority of government is absent or has been seriously eroded', ECOWAS shall in the same vein be active in supporting 'electoral processes, with the cooperation of relevant regional and international organizations', and support 'the respect for human rights and the enhancement of the rule of law and the judiciary'. Article 48, finally, asks ECOWAS and its member states in very general terms to 'promote transparency, accountability and good governance' with the aim 'to eradicate corruption within their territories and in the sub-region'.
Institutions
The Mediation and Security Council (MSC) is the core institution of the Protocol. The sixteen (now: fifteen) ECOWAS member states decided that only nine of them should sit on the MSC. It is the only ECOWAS institution where nine member states can take decisions with a two-thirds majority. 1 The MSC is convened at the heads of state and government, the ambassadorial and the ministerial (foreign ministers) levels. These latter two prepare the decisions of the heads of state and government meeting. In the following section, we will first outline the functional pressure -the need to curb negative externalities -that permitted Nigeria to lock in its domestic democratic advances at 81 the regional level. Then, we will turn to the reasons why autocratic governments supported the protocol, although they already violated its provisions at the time of signing. We will thus particularly highlight the demand for such new standards, and discuss possible supply factors in our conclusion.
CURBING NEGATIVE EXTERNALITIES
The signing of the protocol was only possible because of the existence of a conducive environment. The developments prior to 1999 led to a situation in which pressure to do something at the regional level was increasing, thereby creating a window of opportunity for ECOWAS' action. While these negative externalities can explain why a regional policy emerged, they cannot explain why a document with such high supranational institutions promoting democratic governance was established.
After the end of the Cold War, the United States and even more so the Soviet Union and 1997. In 1999, among all ECOWAS member states, five countries were autocracies with two countries (Guinea-Bissau and Liberia) that had just come out of a civil war.
[ When looking at these data the democratic lock-in hypothesis seems to be confirmed.
Throughout the 1990s the number of democracies incrementally increased including both francophone and anglophone states. Just before the signing of the protocol, the democracies were, for the first time in ECOWAS history, in the majority among all member-states (even more so if, against Polity's ratings, we were to include Senegal and Sierra Leone here). The Transferring this logic to the signing of the ECOWAS Protocol-Mechanism, it is to be expected that only competitive autocracies with strong leverage with Western states (Levitsky and Way 2010), which have both an opposition at home and a need to signal democratic change at the international level, would do so. As with the identification of newly democratizing countries, we can use the Polity IV index to identify autocratic countries in the region. Contrary to newly established democracies, autocratic governments would in addition assume that beyond such a signaling effect, the ECOWAS protocol has no independent impact on its polity.
According to the Polity data, all autocracies in the region were of a more moderate character.
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The Francophone countries such as Burkina Faso, Guinea or Togo had eventually allowed multi-party elections and a free press, but in all three cases the autocratic presidents which had all gained power through military coups a long time ago, had defeated the opposition in mostly unfair elections. Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso, and Gnassingbé Eyadema, ruler of Togo since 1967, were both major players in West African politics with excellent networks among the political elites in the other countries of the region as well as in
France. It is very clear that these rulers did not seriously push for any ECOWAS democracy or governance standards to be introduced. But they were also very experienced actors who knew how to adapt to the new discourse of democratization and human rights. They rightly believed that they would be able to avoid a radical implementation of these Protocols (especially the 2001 one) in their countries in the same way they had been able to eventually manipulate the domestic political democratization process. 7 It is an ironic turn of history that newly democratizing countries, the hegemon, and autocratic countries converged around these texts. Newly democratizing countries were aiming at locking-in their democratic advances at the regional level; Nigeria in addition saw its chance to maintain its intervention capacity in a more procedurally legitimate institution, and autocratic countries were hoping to increase their international legitimacy while assuming that the instruments would not be applied in any case.
The background of disengagement of traditional external actors, increasing negative externalities, and a majority of democratizing states are, however, not sufficient to explain why the mechanism took this specific, supranational democracy-promoting form. In fact,
confronted with a situation of uncertainty and weakly staffed foreign ministries, decisionmakers longed for external knowledge. Our hypothesis is that the specific content of the protocols was mainly supplied by the ECOWAS secretariat in cooperation with a transnational network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence. Building on their institutional support and earlier work in West Africa, and at the UN respectively, Kouyaté and Vogt were able to provide innovative solutions. But to what extent did the UN background also supply the institutional model for the new mechanism? Although we lack more specific knowledge about the in camera decision-making processes, the most important institution of the Protocol-Mechanism seems to be modelled after the UN Security
Council. The name (Mediation and Security Council), the restricted membership (voted for two years), and the majority decision-making rule suggest some similarities between the two councils. But they also suggest that a process of innovative adaptation took place. The ineffectiveness of the UNSC is reduced by abolishing the veto possibility, and the additional function of mediation points to an effort to amend the strongly coercive mandates by less confrontational instruments.
To what extent this transnational coalition of experts actually shaped the decision-making process and was valued because of its 'authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge' (Haas 1992: 3) is difficult to evaluate. Further research and more data are needed in order to conclusively answer this question; but without the convergence of negative externalities, interested member states, and knowledgeable supranational bureaucrats, the ECOWAS' military intervention mechanism would not have been adopted.
